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ABSTRACT
Using cross-sectional data for blue and white collar workers for U.S. cities, we examine
how the tax treatment of fringe benefits affects whether employers offer benefits. Differences
in state-level income taxes cause variation across places in the tax incentives for fringe benefits.
We find that employers respond to tax incentives to offer fringe benefits, especially to blue collar
workers. The tax incentives affect both the probability of basic benefits, such as medical
coverage, and more "marginal" benefits, such as vision and dental coverage. Higher taxes also
reduce the amount of explicit cost sharing for some benefits between employers and employees.
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I. Introduction
In the current debate on reforming health care financing, both expanding and
curtailing tax-advantaged health insurance have been proposed.1 A key ingredient in
analyzing these proposals is the extent to which employer-provided benefits respond
to tax policy. U.S. tax law encourages firms to provide fringe benefits for which the
cost of the benefits are deductible to the employer but not taxable to the employee.
The tax incentives can work on two distinct margins. First, as hoped for by those
proposing more tax incentives, the tax treatment of fringe benefits encourages
employer-provided insurance plans. Therefore, increasing the tax incentives might
increase the number of insured Americans. Second, as feared by those wanting to
limit the tax-advantages for health insurance, once enrolled in an employer-provided
insurance plan, workers have an incentive to have generous insurance plans. This
extra insurance can come in several different forms: lower deductibles, lower
copayments, or coverage of more medical procedures. Overinsurance is one
explanation that has been given for the rapid increase in health care costs (see
Feldstein and Friedman, 1977).
To measure how fringe benefits respond to tax policy, we examine regional
variation in the percentage of workers offered different benefits (e.g., health insurance,
Editorials in The New York Times ("A Tax Cap for Health Reform, December 22, 1992)
and The Washington Post (Who Pays for Health?," January 29, 1992) call for limiting the tax
advantage of fringe benefits. The Congressional Budget Office's (1994) report summarizes
some of the possible changes in the tax system.
1pensions, and dental insurance) from their employers. Since we have data on various
benefits, we can examine both the probability of basic health coverage and the
structure of additional benefits. The tax-advantage of fringe benefits varies within the
U.S. because state income tax rates vary across states. This regional variation in tax
rates helps to identity econometrically the relationship between taxes and fringe
benefits without some of the difficulties of using either time series data or data on
firms or individuals. We return to the econometric advantages of regional data below.
Our results suggest that tax incentives affect both the margin of how many
benefits or how much insurance firms offer rather as well as whether they offer basic
medical insurance. For example, for blue collar workers a one percentage point
increase in the tax rate increases the percentage of workers offered medical insurance
by 1 .8 percentage points and the percentage offered vision coverage by 1 .5
percentage points. However, since more than 90% of the workers in the sample are
offered basic medical coverage but only roughly one-third are offered vision coverage,
the effects of larger changes in tax incentives may be concentrated heavily on more
'marginal' benefits.
We also test whether the frequency of explicit cost sharing between employers
and employees depends on the tax rate. Since employee contributions do not always
receive the same tax advantage as employer contributions, higher tax rates encourage
firms to arrange compensation packages such that fringe benefits are entirely financed
by the firm. For blue collar workers, our results not only suggest that an increase in
personal tax rates increases the percentage of workers offered life insurance but also
2induces a substitution of employer financing for employee contributions.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we discuss the incentive
effects of the tax treatment of fringe benefits and previous empirical studies relating
taxes and fringe benefits. In section III, we present our econometric model, discuss
the construction of our data, and consider the advantages of using regional-level data.
In section IV, we present our results. In section V, we conclude with a discussion of
the policy implications of our results.
II. The Taxation of Fringe Benefits and Previous Studies
A comprehensive income tax base would not distinguish between different
forms of compensation. In contrast, federal and state income tax systems exc'ude
some non-wage compensation from the individual income tax base. Excluded forms
of non-wage compensation include group medical insurance and life insurance. The
exclusion of these benefits from taxable income distorts workers' demand for different
types of compensation and, hence, different types of consumption. Furthermore, this
exclusion encourages the consumption of a particular good (fringe benefit) only if it is
financed in a particular fashion (through the employer-provided plan).
These benefits may be financed through employer contributions, employee
contributions (i.e., salary reductions) or a combination of the two. At the employer-
level, these benefits are taxed symmetrically to wages: employer contributions are
deductible from the firm's tax base. If the employer follows certain Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) rules, salary reductions allow employees to buy insurance without
3paying income taxes on the cost of the insurance. For 1989, 25 percent of employees
who paid for part of their insurance were able to contribute pretax dollars (U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 1990). Even in plans with employee contributions, there are
substantial tax advantages since the employer pays the bulk of the premiums: for
irdividual coverage, Zedlewski (1992) estimates that 43 percent of employers pay the
entire premium and employers pay 85 percent of overall health insurance premiums.2
Combining these statistics suggests that employers who require some worker
contribution still pay 74 percent of total health insurance premiums.3 Thus, from the
employees perspective, both non-contributory (i.e., entirely employer-financed) plans
and contributory plans have significant tax advantages.
Since the employers contribution is deductible from the firm's taxable income,
the tax advantage for fringe benefits comes from the exclusion of employer
contributions and, in some cases, employee contributions from the employees taxable
income. The size of the tax advantage depends on the employee's marginal income
tax rate. For the portion of premiums that are excluded from taxable income,
employees face an effective price of insurance of one minus their marginal tax rate
times the price of the insurance. The tax adjustment, one minus the marginal tax rate,
2 One would expect thatemployer contributions to benefits would be offset by a
compensating reduction in money wages. For a general survey on equalizing differences in
wages, see Rosen (1986). Evidence on equalizing differences for employer-provided benefits
is mixed. In a recent example, Gruber (1992) finds a substantial wage offset using data
around mandated changes in benefits.
That is, if workers in 43 percent of firms do not pay premiums, then workers in the
remaining 57 percent of firms must pay 26 percent of their premiums for the average
employer's share of premiums to equal 85 percent.
4is commonly referred to as the "tax pnce" of the fringe benefit. With graduated
income tax rates, the tax advantage increases with the employee's income.
We focus on the employer's decision to offer a benefit in part because we
have data on benefits offered instead of the number of workers who actually take a
benefit. However, since the worker only gets the tax advantage if the employer oilers
the benefit, the decision whether to offer a benefit is an integral part of the tax effect.
The firm's decision to offer a benefit depends on the demands of its various workers.
The more workers who want a benefit, the more likely a firm is to offer the benefit.
Employee demand for a benefit depends on the marginal utility of receiving the
benefit. In turn, employee demand for employer-provided benefits, rather than buying
the benefit outside of the employer, depends on the size of the tax advantage and the
advantages of group policies. Since the tax advantage increases with the personal
tax rate, the pressure on a firm to offer a benefit should increase with the number of
workers with higher marginal tax rates. As the tax rate increases (either for all
workers of a firm or for a subset of workers), a firm would be more likely to offer a
benefit. Since employees at a firm face different tax rates and have different
preferences for insurance, a firm's decision to offer a benefit is a collective choice
problem (see Goldstein and Pauly, 1976). As discussed below, the collective choice
aspect of employer-provided benefits creates problems for measunng the tax
incentives facing a firm.
Previous empirical work on how the tax system affects fringe benefits
concentrates on three types of data: (1) time-series aggregate data; (2) cross-
5sectional (or panel) data on firms; and (3) cross-sectional data on individuals. The
time-series studies (see, for example, Long and Scott, 1982, Vroman and Anderson,
1984, and Turner, 1 987b) typically find that the tax system encourages non-wage
compensation but the effect is relatively small. The major problem confronting time-
series analysis is controlling for non-tax factors that might affect the demand for fringe
benefits. For example, it is difficult to disentangle the variation in taxes from other
changes in supply and demand conditions for health insurance. Also, the time-series
approach is limited to a single tax rate for each year. Variation in this tax rate needs
to capture changing incentives at the firm-level for an employer to start offering a
fringe benefit. Since the firms decision depends on the demands of workers with
different incomes and tax rates, the amount of fringe benefits may depend on the
distribution of tax rates rather than just a measure of the average tax rate.
Relative to the time-series analyses, studies using cross-sectional data find that
taxes have economically significant effects on the choice between fringe benefits and
wages. The challenge for cross-sectional work is appropriately measuring variation in
tax incentives at either the firm or individual level. At the firm-level, the tax incentive
depends on the distribution of the employees' tax rates. Across firms, this tax
incentive varies because some firms have workers with higher tax rates than other
firms. Unfortunately, if one only considers federal taxes in a single year, employees'
tax rates across firms are determined by income levels of the employees. This
creates a standard problem for "tax price regressions": are the tax effects
econometrically identified with a single cross-section of data? Feenberg (1987)
6discusses this problem for the case of charitable giving. Since tax rates are a non-
linear function of income, measured tax effects may really be non-linearities in how
income affects the demand for fringe benefits. Individual-level data suffer from the
same identification problem for tax effects and also ignores the public goods
dimension of fringe benefits: an employers decision to offer a benefit depends on the
tax rates of the individual and of the individual's co-workers.
Fortunately for studies of cross-sectional data, income tax rates vary by state.
This state-level variation is an important feature for econometrically identifying the tax
effects. Woodbury (1983), Adamche and Sloan (1985), Sloan and Adamche (1986),
Hirsch and Rufolo (1986), Turner (1987a) and Woodbury and Hamermesh (1992) all
use regional variation in tax rates to help identify their models.4 Each paper
incorporates state tax rates differently. For example, Turner imputes each family's
marginal total income tax rate (combining federal and state taxes) based on each
family's characteristics. In contrast, Woodbury and Hamermesh use the sum of the
marginal federal and state income and payroll tax rates for the median faculty member
at each college for which they have data. As discussed below, we use a similar
method for calculating the regional variation in marginal tax rates.
Turner (1987a) and Woodbury and Hamermesh (1992) are the closest
predecessors of our work. Following Turner, we go beyond examining the major
benefits (pensions, life and health insurance) to explore the margin of how many
' One alternative to regional variation in tax rates is changes over time in the Federal tax
treatment of health insurance premiums of the self-employed. Gruber and Poterba (1994)
exploit this variation using a difterences-in-differences estimation strategy and find that the
demand for insurance is sensitive to tax-induced changes in the price of insurance.
7benefits workers receive. Turner finds that taxes play a larger role in the number of
benefits rather than in the presence of the three major benefits. Like Turner, we
examine a variety of fringe benefits but we use aggregate data rather than a sample
of individuals which does not capture the effects of tax rates of each family's co-
workers. Aggregate data have the advantage of isolating the tax effect on the
employers decision rather than using tax rates of each family.
Woodbury and Hamermesh examine the employee benefits of academics
across the U. S. and find that the percentage of compensation received as fringe
benefits is responsive to the tax price of benefits. Like Woodbury and Hamermesh,
we explore the regional variation in fringe benefits and use differences in state tax
rates. Woodbury and Hamermesh use panel data which has the advantage of using
changes in federal tax rates to help identify tax effects. Relative to Woodbury and
Hamermesh, we use a broader sample of workers and focus on the percentage of
workers offered benefits rather than the percentage of compensation coming as fringe
benefits. More importantly, our data allow us to examine the composition of fringe
benefits rather than just the dollar value of benefits.
Ill. Empirical Model and Data
Most previous work with cross-sectional data tries to explain the variation in
either the dollar value or the share of non-wage compensation in total compensation.
We depart from this tradition in part because regional data on expenditures are not
available. Instead, we focus on the fraction of workers in a region who are offered
8each benefit. The fraction of workers offered a benefit has at least one advantage
over expenditure data. Expenditures depend on the cost of the benefit which may
vary across places. However, workers who receive a benefit in a place where the
benefit is expensive may also place a higher dollar value on the benefit. This
endogeneity between the cost of the benefit and an individual's valuation of the benefit
may confound results based on cost measures of fringe benefits. For example, health
insurance prices may vary across regions because the cost of health care varies.
Employees in areas with high health care costs may value health insurance highly
because their potential medical care is expensive. The fraction of workers covered is
less susceptible to this endogeneity problem.
This study is unique in using regionally-aggregated data rather than national
aggregate, firm-level or individual data. By grouping employers within a labor market,
the variation in our data is from differences across labor markets rather than within a
labor market. Within a regional labor market, some employers may offer generous
benefits packages to attract workers who prefer non-wage compensation. Other firms
in the region may offer few benefits but compensate with higher wages. While tax
incentives would affect each firm's level of fringe benefits, benefits may vary within a
region as workers choose the firm with the wage and benefit package that best suits
their tastes. By using regional data, our approach captures how the tax system
affects the average level of benefits in the region.
The data on fringe benefits are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' (BLS)
Occupational Compensation Surveys (formerly called Area Wage Surveys) for 1988-
91992. While the surveys come from different years, each region is surveyed once in
the five year penod. Most of the observations are city-level averages, though for less
populated states the unit of observation may be a region within the state or the whole
state. Unfortunately, earlier surveys do not include comparable information on fringe
benefits. The BLS surveys a sample of establishments with more than 50 worlers in
the region. The surveys include the percentage of blue and white collar workers
offered different fringe benefits. We use data on medical insurance, life insurance,
pensions, dental insurance, vision plans, coverage of hearing and drug or alcohol
rehabilitation. Some of these latter benefits can be provisions within the firm's medical
coverage. For the first three benefits, we also have information on whether the benefit
is financed entirely by the employer.5
We limit our analysis to a subset of the regions surveyed by the BLS for two
reasons. First, not all surveys include data on fringe benefits. Second, and more
importantly, we exclude regions that span more than one state or that might have a
substantial number of commuters from a different state (e.g., Washington D.C.).
Excluding these regions makes it easier to calculate the appropriate tax rate for each
region.
For each fringe benefit, we estimate separate least squares regressions for the
natural logarithm of the ratio of the odds of a worker being offered a benefit to the
As noted above, the tax rules for employee conthbuons to fringe benefits depend on
whether the firm's plans meet certain IRS rules. However, all workers covered by entirely
employer-financed plans receive the tax advantage.
10odds that a worker is not offered each benefit in the region.6 Using the "log-odds"
ratio, rather than the percent of workers offered a benefit, has the advantage that the
dependent variable is not truncated, so the error term does not violate assumptions of
the linear modeL The regression equation for each health-related fringe benefit is:
LN 100 = a + XkBk +PRICE1 + 3 PRlCE1TAX1 + (1)
where p1 is the percent of white or blue collar workers offered the benefit in the region,
Xi,,isa vector of k demographic variables, PRICE1 captures regional variation in the
cost of benefits, TAXi measures the tax advantage of fringe benefits, andis the error
term. Details on the explanatory vanables are below. The subscript i denotes regions
and the subscript k indexes the demographic variables. The coefficients to be
estimated are a, Bk (a vector), y, and 6, the effect of the tax incentive. The measure
of the tax incentive is interacted with the price variable since the after-tax cost of a
benefit is one minus the marginal tax rate times the price of the benefit. If taxes
encourage benefits, 6 would be positive.
Each observation in the regressions is weighted by:
e This iog-odds specification is thegroup data equivalent of a logit regression for data on
individual employees or firms. Of the 2352 region-benefit observations used in the
regressions of equations (1) and (3), 14 observations had 100 percent of the workers covered
and 4 observations had 0 percent of workers covered. To prevent the logarithm of the odds





where POP is the 1990 population of the region. Weighting by population places
relatively more importance on more populated areas and corrects for
heteroscadasticity induced by each regions variables using different population sizes.
The weight includes p(l - p) to place less weight on observations that are near the
end of the possible range of probabilities. See Maddala (1983, p. 29) for details on
the econometric specification.
The main explanatory variable of interest is the tax incentive to compensate
workers with fnnge benefits instead of money. In constructing this variable, we want
to capture the regional variation in income tax rates. As discussed above, previous
papers emphasize the importance of state income taxes as a source of exogenous
variation in the tax incentives for employer-provided benefits. Since the tax incentive
for a given firm depends on the marginal tax rates of all of its employees, it is difficult
to create precise measures of the tax incentive.7 One advantage of using regional
data is that it is relatively easy to link regional data on fringe benefits with interstate
variation in income tax rates.
We use the total marginal tax rate at the state level for 1990. This tax rate is
One hypothesis is that firms respond to the demands of the workers as if the workers
could vote on whether the firm should otter a benefit. Under this framework, the tax rate of
the decisive voter would be the critical tax rate for measuring the tax incentive facing the firm.
The decisive voter may be the voter with median preferences (which with some added
restrictions, would be the worker with the median income) or certain blocks of workers (e.g.,
managers) may have more influence on the firm's decisions than other groups of workers.
12the sum of the federal and state tax rates.8 We report results using tax rates
calculated for a representative household taken as a married couple with $40,000 of
state and Federal taxable income that itemizes its deductions. The tax rates capture
differences in state rates and state tax rules regarding the deductibility of Federal
income taxes from state taxable income. By assuming both Federal and state taxable
income of $40,000, our tax rates do not capture some subtle interstate differences in
the definition of taxable income. However, since these differences are unlikely to
change the marginal tax rate of the representative household,9 we believe our tax rate
estimates capture the regional variation in income taxes applying to wage income.
To measure the regional variation in the cost of health-related benefits, we
include area factors for calculating insurance premiums for small firms (fewer than fifty
employees) in each region.1° The area factors, denoted as PRICE1 in equation (1),
are adjustment factors for regional differences in the costs of buying a standard
See Bogart and Gentry (1992) for more details on the construction of state-level marginal
income tax rates (though their tax rates are specific to capital gains income). Unlike some
previous studies (Turner, 1987a and 1987b, and Woodbury and Hamermesh, 1992), we ignore
any incentives created from non-wage compensation being excluded from the payroll tax base
for Social Security for two reasons. First, it is unclear whether the payroll tax should be
included because excluding fringe benefits from the payroll tax base also lowers future Social
Security benefits (see Sloan and Adamche, 1986). Second, since Social Security is a federal
program, including the payroll tax would only change the level of the tax variable without
affecting the regional variation.
For example, for 1990, 30 of the 41 states with broad-based income taxes had top
brackets beginning at or below $30,000 (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, SiQnificant Features of Fiscal Federalism). Thus, fairly large changes in taxable
income would typically not change the representative household's marginal state tax rate.
° We are grateful to Lee Hart of The Prudential for providing this data. While larger firms
face similar variation in costs, they may negotiate individually with the insurance company or
choose to self-insure.
13insurance policy. They control for region-specific differences in insurance company
loss ratios (ratio of claims to premiums) for health insurance after controlling for
differences iii industry, benefits included in the policy and demographics of the firm.
The firm pays a premium equal to the national premium times the area factor. The
area factors are for 1993 policies (historical data are not available). Area factors vary
by three-digit zip code. We include the area factors for the general delivery zip code
in the city or, when a general delivery zip code is not available, a centrally located zip
code in the region (or a large city within the region).
In addition to the tax variable, we control for various factors that might affect the
level of fringe benefits in a region. Since the age structure of the population may
affect demand for fringe benefits, we include the percent of the population between
the ages of 35 and 44 and the percent of the population between ages 55 and 64
from the 1990 Census. Under the hypothesis that a better educated workforce might
have a higher demand for fringe benefits, we include the percent of the population
over age 25 with more that twelve years of schooling in 1980 from the 1980 Census.
Since our dependent variable includes government workers, the fraction of the labor
force employed by the government might affect fringe benefits since government
workers are more likely to receive basic benefits packages than private sector workers
(see, for example, U.S. General Accounting Office, 1992). We include the state-level
fraction of manufacturing workers who belonged to a union in 1989 since unions have
typically bargained for more generous fringe benefits. Even though white collar
workers are less likely to unionize, we include this variable in the regressions for white
14collar workers because of the collective choice nature of the decision to offer fringe
benefits.
Since the Occupational Compensation Surveys are staggered across years, we
include a set of dummy variables for the year of the survey to capture any national
level trends in fringe benefits. To avoid multicollinearity, we omit the year dummy for
1988. The staggered feature of the data also makes it difficult to measure consistently
the regional variation in the tax incentive for fringe benefits. Fortunately, there were
no major shifts in federal tax rates between 1988 and 1992. In order to get a
snapshot of the variation in state tax rates, we use tax rates for 1990. Two things
mitigate any adverse effects of using tax data from a single year. First, decisions
about fringe benefits are long-term decisions of employers. It is not practical for a firm
to change its benefits package every year. Thus, the fraction of workers offered a
benefit should respond to long-run tax incentives. Second, state tax systems rarely
change.
Since we do not have a price variable for life insurance and pensions, we




The hypothesis that higher tax rates increase employer-provided benefits suggests
that the coefficient on the tax variable should be positive.
Since all firms can invest pension contributions in the same capital markets, the price of
pension plans should not vary across regions. For life insurance, the cost could vary by
region or by firm depending on the age structure of the population. However, we do not have
estimates of regional variation in mortality.
15The tax incentive to offer benefits depends on how the employer finances the
benefits. As discussed above, for some plans that require employee contributions, the
employees contribution is not tax advantaged. In this case, higher personal tax rates
give firms an incentive to arrange compensation packages such that fringe benefits
are entirety firm- financed. To test whether taxes affect the decision of how to finance
a benefit conditional on the employer offering the benefit, we estimate the following
equation for medical and life insurance:12
LN a' + & TAX. + v (4)
100-ft
where f, is the percent of workers with the benefit entirely financed by the employer in
region i conditional on being offered the benefit, v1 is the error term and other variables
are defined above. The variable, f, is 100 times the ratio of the percent of workers
with the benefit entirety financed by the employer to the percent of workers offered the
benefit in region i. The regressions are weighted similarly to equations (1) and (3).If
taxes affect how benefits are financed, then higher tax rates should lead to a larger
fraction of employees receiving benefits having their benefits financed entirely by the
employer. Of course, rearranging the method of financing benefits may result in a
change in other forms of compensation (e.g., less money compensation) which is not
controlled for in the regression.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the dependent and explanatory
12 Since typical contributory retirementplans (e.g., 401(k) plans) allow employees to
contribute pre-tax dollars, the tax rate should not affect a firm's choice between types of
pension plans.
16variables. Typically, a higher percentage of white collar workers receive a benefit than
blue collar workers, though anti-discrimination rules prevent the differences from being
too large. Across the two types of workers, the pattern of benefits offered is similar:
health insurance and life insurance are the most common benefits while vision and
hearing coverage are the least common.
IV. Results
Blue Collar Workers. In table 2, we present estimates of equation (1) for
health-related benefits and equation (3) for non-health-related benefits for blue collar
workers. For nine of the ten regressions (the exception is hearing coverage), the
coefficient on the tax variable is positive and statistically significant at the five percent
significance level (using a two-tailed test) in eight of the regressions indicating that the
income tax system encourages fringe benefits. In the log-odds specification, the effect
of changing an exogenous variable on the probability of benefit coverage depends on
the level of the probability.'3 We evaluate the effects of exogenous variables at the
mean probability of each benefit. Evaluated at the mean area factor (price) of 0.67, a
one percentage point reduction in the marginal tax rate would reduce the percentage
of workers offered medical insurance by 1.84 percentage points, dental insurance by
1.18 percentage points, vision coverage by 1.47 percentage points, and drug and
alcohol abuse treatment by 0.56 percentage points. Thus, taxes affect both basic
' A change in anexogenous variable changes the probability by approximately the
coefficient multiplied by the probability times one minus the probability. Thus, a unit change in
an exogenous variable affects a low or high probability by less than a probability that is close
to 0.5.
17benefits and the degree of generosity of the benefits pacKage.
In addition to the tax effects on health-related benefits, the results indicate that
the tax rate affects how many workers are offered life insurance and pension benefits.
A one percentage point increase in the tax rate increases the percentage of workers
offered life insurance by 0.83 percentage points and the percentage offered pension
plans by 0.89 percentage points. Taxes have a larger effect on the percentage of
workers offered life insurance and pensions entirely financed by the firm: a one
percentage point increase in the tax rate increases the percentage of workers with
employer-financed life insurance by 1.21 percentage points and employer-financed
pensions by 1.33 percentage points. We return to the differences between
contnbutory and non-contributory plans in the discussion of table 4.
Overall, the model explains a considerable portion of the regional variation in
employer-offered benefits. The adjusted R2's range from 0.26 to 0.79. The
coefficients on other variables in the regressions conform with their expected signs
and some are statistically significant. For example, The percent of workers offered
benefits typically increases with unionization at the state level. The coefficient on price
is negative except for the hearing benefits regression. For medical insurance, a one
standard deviation increase in the area factor, reduces the percent of blue collar
workers offered health insurance by 6.3 percentage points which suggests that firms'
decisions to offer benefits are sensitive to the cost of the benefits.'4
This change is evaluated at the mean percent offered medical benefits and the mean
tax rate.
18White Collar Workers. Table 3 has results for equations (1) and (3) for white
collar workers. Relative to the results for blue collar workers, these results do not lend
strong support to the hypothesis that taxes are important determinants of whether
firms offer fringe benefits. While seven of the ten coefficients on the tax variables are
positive, the coefficients for white collar workers are typically not statistically significant
at the five percent level. All of the tax coefficients except one are smaller (in absolute
value) than their counterparts for blue collar workers. Furthermore, the regressions for
white collar workers have less explanatory power than the regressions for blue collar
workers, as evidenced by the lower adjusted R2s for most of the benefits.
Overall, the results suggest that taxes may be less important for white collar
workers than for blue collar workers and variables other than those included in the
regressions may be important for white collar workers. Since white collar workers are
more likely to have higher tax rates than blue collar workers, it is surprising that the
tax variable is more important for blue collar workers. However, varying the income
level (and hence tax rate) of the representative household does not reverse this
pattern. One possible explanation of the lower predictive power for white collar is that
white collar workers are a smaller, more diverse group of employees within each
region.
Sensitivity Analysis. These results are robust to wo types of alternative
specifications. To conserve space, we do not report these results in tables. First, to
explore the validity of our measure of the price of health benefits, we estimated
different specifications of equation (1). For health-related benefits, the qualitative
19results are similar for regressions without the price variable (i.e., equation (3)) and for
regressions with separate price and tax variables but no interaction between the two
variables.
Second, to check whether the tax variable captures regional variation in income
taxes, we used two types of alternative tax variables: (1) we constructed marginal tax
rates for alternative representative households; and (2) state income tax collections
per $100 of state personal income for 1990 (from the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations' Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism). Specifically,
we considered three different representative households: (1) a family of four with
adjusted gross income of $35,000 taking the standard deduction and exemptions; (2)
a single person with adjusted gross income of $28,000 taking the standard deduction;
and (3) a family with itemized deductions and taxable income of $100,000. The
second alternative tax variable is an average state income tax rate. Replacing the
marginal tax rate for families with $40,000 of taxable income in equations (1) and (3)
with these alternative tax variables yields qualitatively similar results to those in tables
2 and 3 although the coefficients are less statistically significant with the average tax
rate measures.15
Financing Major Fringe Benefits. Since in some plans employee
contributions are not tax-advantaged, higher personal income tax rates give employers
an incentive to use non-contributory plans to provide benefits. Therefore, conditional
IS Since the stateaverage tax rate is not a total of Federal and state taxes, for the
regressions with the average tax rate, we estimated a model with the separate price and tax
variables without an interaction.
20on a firm offering benefits, higher tax rates should increase the chance that a firm
either meets the IRS rules for employee contributions to be tax-advantaged or to not
require employee contributions for benefits. Table 4 presents the regression results
from equation (4) for medical and life insurance.
For blue collar workers, the tax rate coefficient is statistically insignificant for
medical insurance but positive and statistically significant at the five percent
significance level for life insurance. These results indicate that an increase in income
tax rates induces a substitution from contributory plans to non-contnbutory plans for
life insurance. For example, a one percentage point increase in the tax rate increases
the percentage of workers whose life insurance is entirely financed by the employee
by 1 .6 percentage points. Recall from table 2 that an increase in the tax rate
increases the likelihood of coverage for both medical and life insurance for blue collar
workers. This substitution is in addition to the increased frequency of benefits. This
substitution suggests that higher taxes reduce the amount of explicit cost sharing
between employees and employers for benefits. The lack of cost sharing between
employees and employers may contribute to rapidly increasing health care costs. The
unionization variable has a statistically significant positive effect on the fraction of firms
that entirely finance benefits.
For white collar workers, the tax rate coefficient for neither medical nor life
insurance is statistically significant. The explanatory power of the regressions for
white collar workers is much lower than that of the regressions for blue collar workers.
As with the results in tables 2 and 3, taxes seem more important for blue collar
21workers than white collar workers. Also consistent with the results in tables 2 and 3,
the results are robust to using alternative measures of the tax incentives.
V. Policy Implications and Conclusion
Using regionally-aggregated data on fringe benefits offered by employers and
interstate variation in tax rates, we offer new evidence on the effects of income taxes
on the level of fringe benefits offered by employers. Overall, our results are consistent
with previous cross-sectional studies of the effects of taxes on fringe benefits. Unlike
other studies (except Turner, 1987a), we identify both the margin of whether an
employer offers basic benefits and the margin of how many benefits the employer
offers. Taxes seem important on both margins. We also estimate whether taxes
affect how firms elect to finance fringe benefits and whether taxes affect the amount of
explicit cost sharing between employers and employees. Our main empirical findings
are:
Higher income taxes increase the utilization of fringe benefits. This increase is
both economically and statistically significant for blue collar workers. The
results are less pronounced for white collar workers.
Taxes have a similar effect on "rnarginar' benefits such as vision coverage and
dental insurance and whether workers are offered basic medical insurance.
Higher income taxes induce some substitution from contributory plans with
explicit cost sharing towards non-contributory (entirely employer-finance) plans
with no explicit cost sharing. This substitution is consistent with firms financing
fringe benefits in a way that minimizes their employees' taxes.
Our estimates suggest that tax rates affect the level and types of benefits
22offered by employers as well as the choice of how these benefits are financed. Many
current proposals are geared at limiting or capping the tax advantages of fnnge
benefits. These proposals call for either a limited exclusion (or credit) of fringe
benefits at the level of the personal income tax or a cap on the amount that employers
àan deduct for fringe benefits per employee from firm level income. The advantage of
these proposals is that they maintain a tax subsidy for basic medical insurance without
subsidizing excessive fringe benefits. Since our results suggest that taxes affect both
basic benefits as well as more "marginal' benefits, these policies may curtail the
offering of more "marginal" fringe benefits without greatly influencing how many people
are offered basic coverage. While we cannot offer direct evidence on the levels of
copayments and deductibles, the results are consistent with these policies affecting
the amount of insurance individuals have, rather than whether individuals have any
insurance at all. However, our results are estimated using a relatively small amount of
variation in the tax rates, so it is difficult to extrapolate the effects of these proposals
since these policies may have substantial effects on the pre-tax price of insurance and
medical care. With this caveat in mind, the results suggest that these policies would
have their intended effect of reducing the number of people with overly generous
benefits packages: the alternative policy of eliminating the special tax treatment of all
fringe benefits might affect the how many people receive basic coverage.
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25</ref_section>Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean Stan. 0ev. Minimum Maximum
Fringe Benefits: Blue Collar
Health Insurance 89.4 8.4 61 100
Health Entirely Firm-Funded 48.5 15.4 14 84
Dental 67.2 15.4 16 93
Vision 33.6 18.9 1 75
Hearing 19.8 14.4 0 62
Drug/Alcohol 80.5 10.7 53 99
Life Insurance 89.6 6.4 67 99
Life Entirely Firm-Funded 73.1 11.5 40 94
Pension 67.4 13.5 40 93
Pension Entirely Firm-Funded 59.6 14.3 28 87
Fringe Benefits: White Collar
Health Insurance 95.9 5.7 72 100
Health Entirely Firm-Funded 46.0 14.2 20 85
Dental 76.6 157 22 98
Vision 34.6 19.6 0 79
Hearing 18.3 14.6 0 65
Drug/Alcohol 86.9 11.2 50 99
Life Insurance 96.0 4.8 61 100
Life Entirely Firm-Funded 81.9 10.0 42 98
Pension 78.7 12.3 35 98
Pension Entirely Firm-Funded 70.4 12.8 33 94
Explanatory Variables
Marginal Tax Rate 0.311 0.0193 0.28 0.345
Population Ages 35-44 15.2 1.3 11.3 18.7
Population Ages 55-64 8.1 1.2 4.5 11.0
Govl workers per 100 6.76 2.54 4.12 16.54
Unionization 19.9 12.7 2.4 51.6
High School Education 69.1 7.7 41.3 83.7
Area Factors for Health Ins. 0.67 0.28 0.37 2.12
26Table 2:  Fringe Benefits for Blue Collar Workers 
Dependent Vanable:  Ln(p/(100 - pj) where p = percentage of woricers oflered each benefit 
Medical  Medical 
from firm 
Dental  Vision  Heanng  Drug & 
Alcohol 
Life  Life 
from tirm 
Pension  Pension 
from firm 


























































































































































#otobs.  108  108  108  108  105  107  108  108  108  108 
Adj. R2  0.28  0.57  0.53  0.52  0.79  0.26  0.35  0.40  0.47  0.49 
Coefliaents  are estimated using weighted least squares with the weights described in the text.  denotes coefficients that differ  from zero at the 
5 percent significance level (two-tailed test).  The regressions also include year dumnies for the year of the survey. 
27 Table 3:  FrInge Benefits for White Collar Workers 
Dependent Vanable:  Ln(p/(100 - pt)) where p  percentage of woricers ottered each benefit 
Medical  Medical 
from finn 
Dental  Vision  Hearing  Drug & 
Alcohol 
Life  Life 
from firm 
Pension  Pension 
from firm 
Constant  9.45'  -0.93  -359'  -17.92'  -24.17'  -204  -1.16  -1.58  -2.25  -1.72 
(3.95)  (0.90)  (1.33)  (2.17)  (2.26)  (1.45)  (4.18)  (1.65)  (1.35)  (1.25) 
Pop35  0.15  0.075  0.072  0.43'  0.59'  0.15  0.19  0.038  -0.0020  0.048 
(0.22)  (0.049)  (0.072)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.081)  (0.15)  (0.066)  (0.053)  (0.050) 
Pop55  0.35  -0.054  -0.11  -0.16  0.10  -0.0028  0,38'  0.12  0.14'  0.13' 
(0.22)  (0.052)  (0.079)  (0.15)  (0.16)  (0.081)  (0.17)  (0.070)  (0.057)  (0.053) 
Educatl2  -0.086'  -0.0015  0.064'  0.12  0.11*  0.029'  -0.040  0.012  0.017  -0.0043 
(0.039)  (0.009)  (0.013)  (0.024)  (0.027)  (0.014)  (0.029)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.009) 
Govt  -0.063  0.059'  -0.031  -0.0046  0.067  -0.070  -0.018  0.016  0.045  -0.0014 
workers  (0.11)  (0.026)  (0.038)  (0.077)  (0.091)  (0.041)  (0.074)  (0.031)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
Union89  0.051  O.013  O.014  0.029'  0.073'  0.021'  0.043'  0.018'  0.027'  0.019' 
(0.017)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.008)  (0.014)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Price  -11.50'  0.80  0.16  2.27  10.53  -0.63 
(5.46)  (1.16)  (1.70)  (3.51)  (3.97)  (1.81) 
Pnce • Tax  23.29  -1.87  1.65  -4.18  -30.25'  1.63 
(17.38)  (3.65)  (5.27)  (11.01)  (12.75)  (5.55) 








#ofobs.  108  108  108  108  105  107  108  108  108  108 
Adj. A2  0.44  0.28  0.38  0.67  0.70  0.25  0.32  0.16  0.40  0.35 
Coeffiaents  are estimated using weighted least squares with weights described in the text.  'denotes coefficients that differ from zero at the 5 
percent sigrvficance level (two-tailed test).  The regressions also Include year dummies for the year of the  survey. 
28 Table 4: Form of Financing Fringe Benefits
DependentVariable: Ln(f/(100 - f)
where f,looPercentage of workers offered benefit entirely financed by firm divided by
the percentage of workers offered benefit
,
Blue Collar White Collar

























































#ofobs. 108 108 108 108
Adj. A2 0.51 0.51 0.19 0.11
Coefficients are estimated using weighted least squares as described in the text. • denotes coefficients
that differ from zero at the 5 percent significance level (two-tailed test). The regressions also include
year dummies for the year of the survey.
29